PAIN RELIEF PROMOTION ACT (HR2260)
WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF PHYSICIANS
FOR COMPASSIONATE CARE TO
UNITED STATES SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
APRIL 25, 2000
SUMMARY STATEMENT
Physicians for Compassionate Care, an organization providing education
about pain relief and palliative care, urges passage of the Pain
Relief Promotion Act. This testimony provides new information to
supplement and update oral and written testimony to the U.S. House
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, June 24, 1999. This new
information falls into two categories. First, since hearings last
June, the American Medical Association held intensive and comprehensive
discussions before its entire House of Delegates, including representatives
from the whole field of medicine. These meetings and subsequent negotiations
thoroughly addressed all concerns raised by detractors of the Pain
Relief Promotion Act. Second, new examples of the misuse of federally
controlled substances for assisted suicide and euthanasia in Oregon
have surfaced. These cases reveal failure to protect the mentally
infirm and those under pressure from their families, involvement
of health maintenance organizations in assisted suicide, failed assisted
suicide attempts, and involuntary euthanasia in the hospice setting.
These abuses make it increasingly clear that allowing the use of
federally controlled substances for assisted suicides constitutes
a public danger.
ANY LEGITIMATE MEDICAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE PAIN RELIEF PROMOTION
ACT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED
Widespread agreement exists, even among those not initially favoring
the Pain Relief Promotion Act (PRPA), that funding for improved education
and research about pain treatment and palliative care is much needed.
Yet, while admitting that assisted suicide is not a medical procedure,
that it constitutes a public danger, and that it should not be allowed,
some detractors of the Pain Relief Promotion Act still claimed last
fall that this bill might create new authority for the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) and might create new penalties for physicians, thereby
having a hypothetical "chilling effect" on the provision of pain
treatment and palliative care. A second concern raised by some critics
of the PRPA was that it might somehow alter the balance of federal
and state authorities in the regulation of controlled substances
and the practice of medicine. Aggressive promotion of such fears
by those favoring assisted suicide led to further consideration by
the American Medical Association (AMA) of its position supporting
the PRPA. This time, the discussion took place in a full debate of
the entire House of Delegates -- the highest decision making body
of the organization -- resulting in clear reaffirmation of support
for the Pain Relief Promotion Act. Physicians for Compassionate Care
played a prominent role in these discussions. Reaffirmed support
was followed by the negotiation of and agreement upon proposed new
wording to reassure those few remaining critics that the Pain Relief
Promotion Act creates no new authority of the DEA and does nothing
to alter the roles of the federal and state governments in the regulation
of controlled substances.
The House of Delegates of the AMA, in that it has representatives
from virtually all specialty societies and numerous other medical
groups, both large and small, as well as from the state medical societies,
represents 95% of practicing physicians in America. Even physicians
who are not delegates to the AMA can have their voices heard at this
meeting. Among all those who testified, there were no concerns about
the Pain Relief Promotion Act raised other than these two -- fear
of a theoretical "chilling effect" and speculation about roles of
federal and state government in the regulation of the practice of
medicine.
Data presented at those meetings and among physicians across the
country made it abundantly clear that those few states that have
enacted laws similar to the Pain Relief Promotion Act showed no "chilling
effect." On the contrary, per capita use of morphine, increased.
In Rhode Island, for instance, the per capita morphine use more than
doubled after a similar law was passed. While per capita morphine
use figures do not accurately reflect the adequacy of pain treatment,
they do reflect levels of physician comfort in prescribing controlled
substances. Close examination of the PRPA also showed that fears
of new penalties were entirely unfounded, because the Pain Relief
Act creates no new penalties. In fact, it provides new protection
for physicians against existing penalties by making it perfectly
clear, for the first time, what has always been true in medicine
-- that aggressive pain management can be appropriate medical care
even if in rare instances it might inadvertently increase the risk
of death. It was also pointed out that wording had already been read
into the record of the United States Congress by the authors of the
Act late last fall, clarifying that the PRPA is not intended to create
any new authority for the DEA. This careful examination of available
data and of the Act itself showed that the fears of any possible "chilling
effect" were entirely unfounded.
While it became very clear that the Pain Relief Promotion Act provided
new protections for both physicians and patients, a few continued
to harbor doubts concerning the roles of the federal and state governments.
These concerns were addressed through lengthy discussions and the
proposal of additional wording that clarifies that the Pain Relief
Promotion Act shall not be interpreted to alter the balance of the
state and federal governments in the practice of medicine and the
regulation of controlled substances. Now, the remaining few critics
of the bill have been reduced to somewhat inconsistently arguing
both that the Pain Relief Promotion Act may not give doctors enough
protection and that it may give them too much protection. Careful
consideration by the deliberative bodies of the field of medicine,
however, have determined that a proper balance, which optimally protects
both doctors and patients, has been achieved.
Virtually all the issues and fears raised now have been thoroughly
studied and discussed and addressed with due deliberation to the
satisfaction of the vast majority of physicians, even among those
who initially may have harbored any concerns. The important details
have been carefully addressed and settled. Yet, in the meantime,
innocent patients in Oregon have continued to die untimely deaths
through the administration of lethal doses of federally controlled
substances using federal DEA licenses, instead of for appropriate
pain treatment and palliative care. How many more American citizens
will be given deadly doses of federally controlled substances using
federal DEA licenses, before this enlightened piece of legislation
is enacted, clarifying that federally controlled substances are to
be used for pain treatment and palliative care, not for lethal overdoses?
NEW CASES CONFIRM THE PUBLIC DANGER OF ASSISTED SUICIDE
No Protection for the Mentally Infirm
Previous testimony (June 24, 1999) by Physicians for Compassionate
Care demonstrated how allowing the use of controlled substances for
assisted suicide led to the first publicly reported case of legalized
assisted suicide in Oregon being given a lethal overdose instead
of treatment for her depression, despite the well documented fact
that she had been diagnosed as depressed. Since that time, another
case, this time a woman with dementia under pressure from her family
was given assisted suicide by her health maintenance organization
(HMO) doctor using federally controlled substances.
Mrs. Kate Cheney was an elderly, Oregon woman with growing dementia
and the diagnosis of a potentially terminal cancer (Barnett, 1999;
Smith, 1999; Hamilton, 2000). When her daughter accompanied her to
her doctor's appointment to formally request assisted suicide, the
doctor did not agree with that course of action. It was the daughter
(Barnett, 1999), not the patient, who then insisted the mother have
a new doctor within her HMO, Kaiser Permanente. The doctor change
for the mother was granted to the daughter.
This second doctor was willing to give Mrs. Cheney assisted suicide
and arranged for psychiatric for evaluation, because it was standard
at this HMO in its assisted suicide procedure. The psychiatrist,
who released a written report to the newspaper, found that Mrs. Cheney
had short-term memory deficits and dementia. The assisted suicide
request appeared to be the daughter's "agenda" (Barnett, 1999).
The daughter who also accompanied Mrs. Cheney to this appointment, "coached
her" in her answers, even when the psychiatrist asked her not to
do so. Concerning the patient, the psychiatrist observed, "she does
not seem to be explicitly pushing for this" (Barnett, 1999). She
was deemed lacking sufficient capacity to weigh options about assisted
suicide; thus, she was not eligible for doctor-assisted suicide.
The patient accepted this assessment. Her daughter, however, "became
angry" (Barnett, 1999). It was the daughter, not the patient, who
then "decided on a second competency evaluation" (Barnett, 1999).
Kaiser HMO apparently authorized this second off-panel mental health
evaluation. This new psychologist admitted the patient could not
even remember when she was diagnosed with terminal cancer, although
it had only been within the last three months. She also wrote that
the patient's "choices may be influenced by her family's wishes and
her daughter, Erika, may be somewhat coercive"(Barnett, 1999). Nevertheless,
she approved the assisted suicide.
With two conflicting mental health opinions, the final decision
came down to yet another Kaiser HMO doctor-administrator, Robert
Richardson, who approved giving a lethal overdose to this elderly
woman under pressure from her family. Kaiser Permanente is a fully
capitated HMO with a profit sharing plan for its doctors. Dr. Richardson
may or may not have directly thought of the economic advantages to
his organization and his own profit sharing plan in making his decision
about Mrs. Cheney. Nevertheless, the existence of an economic incentive
program put in place purposefully to induce doctors to reduce medical
costs, an incentive system that in this case favored doctor- assisted
suicide over expensive medical care, did exist and should be noted.
The problems with this well documented case in Oregon (Barnett,
1999; Smith, 1999; Hamilton, 2000) were not reported in the Oregon
Health Division (OHD) report (Sullivan et al., 2000). And psychiatric
evaluation served no protective function for her, since an opinion
protecting her against assisted suicide, merely prompted the daughter,
not the patient, to search for another opinion.
Outside pressure or influence for assisted suicide is not at all
uncommon, once assisted suicide becomes legalized. In fact, in the
Netherlands, over half the doctors feel it is fine to actually suggest
to a patient who has not requested it that assisted suicide may be
appropriate for them (Hendin et al., 1997). Numerous cases of patients
under family pressure to commit assisted suicide have been recorded
in the Netherlands (Canady, 1996). As the Cheney case illustrates,
these kinds of pressures are already appearing in Oregon. For these
and other reasons, use of federally controlled substances for assisted
suicide presents a public danger.
Assisted Suicide Inevitably Expands to Include Involuntary Euthanasia
Five seriously ill patients in a Sheridan, Oregon, hospice were
given excessive doses of a federally controlled substance, morphine,
by Michael J. Coons, between November 1997 and January, 1998, just
after the Oregon assisted suicide law was implemented, according
to criminal investigators (Tims, 2000a). The overdoses resulted in
the deaths of four of the five patients. Some patients were determined
by investigators to have refused pain medication and were given it
nonetheless. Another was given repeated narcotic doses when he was
unconscious or unresponsive (Tsao, 2000). The one woman who survived
had been placed on hospice, which meant that she had been determined
to be "terminally ill" and to have less than six months to live,
by the nurse who eventually gave her a life threatening overdose.
She turns out not to have met criteria for "terminal illness" after
all, because two years later, she is still alive. Her experience
with the attempts to kill her with a lethal overdose of federally
controlled substances, however, have undermined her trust in the
medical care system and at night she now makes sure the door to her
room is always locked (Tims, 2000b). The other four patients did
not live to struggle with their fears.
In Oregon, where the lives of the seriously ill have been devalued
by the acceptance of giving some patients deadly overdoses of federally
controlled substances, there was an inordinate delay in the investigation
of these cases. Complaints were dismissed by agency after agency,
until the persistence of the daughter of one of the victims, finally
succeeded, one-and-a-half years later, in demanding an inquiry (Tims,
2000b). The daughter of the single survivor said she did not know
about the overdose of her mother until it was published in the newspaper,
two years later. She was outraged (Tims, 2000a).
Erosion of the conditions of trust in the doctor-patient relationship
has already begun in the state of Oregon, as has already happened
in the Netherlands. While some supporters of legalized assisted suicide
using federally controlled substances might wish to argue that the
overdosing of these five hospice patients was an aberration resulting
from a single deranged individual's action, there is considerable
statistical evidence to the contrary. Once assisted suicide using
controlled substances is allowed in some circumstances, individual
medical personnel increasingly interpret that acceptance as approval
of other kinds of killing in the medical setting.
In the Netherlands, where doctor-assisted suicide has been allowed
longer than in Oregon, it has been clearly demonstrated that killing
in the medical setting moves from doctor-assisted suicide to active
euthanasia, from the terminally ill to the chronically-ill, from
voluntary to non-voluntary (Canady, 1996). For each voluntary assisted
suicide in the Netherlands, there are more than twice as many cases
of involuntary euthanasia. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed, "The
Dutch government's own study revealed that in 1990, there were 2,300
cases of voluntary euthanasia (defined as 'the deliberate termination
of another's life at his request'), 400 cases of assisted suicide,
and more than 1,000 cases of euthanasia without an explicit request.
In addition to these latter 1,000 cases, the study found an additional
4,941 cases where physicians administered lethal morphine overdoses
without the patient's explicit consent" (U.S. Supreme Court, 1997).
It is not surprising, then, that such expansion of assisted suicide
using federally controlled substances to the area of involuntary
euthanasia is already becoming apparent in Oregon.
State Monitoring is Ineffective
The Oregon Health Division (OHD) review of 1998 reported cases of
assisted suicide, all of whom received lethal overdoses of federally
controlled substances, was particularly criticized because of "its
failure to address the limits of the information it has available,
overreaching its data to draw unwarranted conclusions" (Foley and
Hendin, 1999). The report's declaration of a lack of problems was
clearly unwarranted. The first publicly reported case of assisted
suicide was noted to have been diagnosed with depression, yet the
report failed to reveal this fact. Neither did the report mention
that same woman mentioned that concerns about finances were one motivating
factor in her decision for assisted suicide. The OHD apparently overlooked
these problems and other problems, because it only interviewed the
doctors who prescribed the lethal drugs and who therefore had a vested
interest in justifying their recent behavior.
Since that time, OHD has issued a second report (Sullivan et al.,
2000) with similar unwarranted reassurances based upon similar methodological
shortcomings (Hamilton, 2000). This year, the OHD also interviewed
some family members, but those family members were chosen by the
assisted suicide doctors themselves and were also motivated to justify
their recent behavior. The patients themselves were never interviewed
by OHD prior to their being given overdoses of controlled substances;
neither were the medical records systematically examined, with due
consideration for patient confidentiality, by outside researchers.
There is solid evidence that not all the cases were reported. At
least one assisted suicide attempt resulted in such disturbing symptoms
that the family called 911 (Hamilton, 2000). The patient was taken
to the hospital and resuscitated. This case apparently was never
reported. This instance when a known failed assisted suicide case
was not reported suggests that there is skewed reporting with complications
being hidden. Assisted suicide and euthanasia advocate, Dr. Sherwin
Nuland (2000), cast doubt on the credibility of the Oregon report
when he observed that a Dutch report in the New England Journal of
Medicine indicated 18% of assisted suicide attempts needed to be
ended with lethal injection, usually due to complications (Groenewoud
et al., 2000), yet the OHD insisted it has yet to find a complication.
The OHD also failed to mention documented dementia in the Kate Cheney
case, similar to its failure to mention the diagnosis of depression
in the first publicly reported case that should have been discussed
in the first report. It did not mention known multiple or conflicting
mental health opinions. It only mentioned that 10 of 27 cases were
referred for such evaluations, but said nothing about the results.
Neither did the OHD report that there were any instance of family
pressure or coercion, despite the fact that two mental health professionals
were known to have found such factors present in the Kate Cheney
case. It is not known in how many other cases such pressures may
have played a part.
Concerning the issue of economic pressures, OHD only asserted that
all the assisted suicide cases were insured. It provided no information
about what the financial arrangements of the insurance companies
might be. It did not mention the capitated and profit sharing plan
of Kaiser HMO where Mrs. Cheney died. It did not mention the rationing
of health care and the barriers to mental health care in the Oregon
Health Plan (described in previous testimony, June 24, 1999) and
upon which four cases had to rely. And, it said nothing about how
many patients belonged to HMOs which put limits on payments for in-home
palliative care at very low amounts, yet fully fund assisted suicide,
as Qual Med HMO is reported to do. Instead of gathering useful information,
the OHD once again overreached its data and provided unsubstantiated
reassurances.
This inability to monitor and control assisted suicide using federally
controlled substances with federal DEA registrations, once it is
legalized, further demonstrates the public danger of allowing use
of federally controlled substances for giving lethal overdoses to
American citizens.
Assisted Suicide Expands to Include Legalized Lethal Injection
In previous testimony, the case of Patrick Matheny's failed assisted
suicide attempt was described. Mr. Matheny was a man with amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (ALS), who received through the mail a huge quantity
of barbiturates prescribed by an assisted-suicide doctor (Barnett,
1999). After two attempts at swallowing the contents of the large
number of capsules failed, because of his medical condition, his
brother-in-law said he "helped" him die and complained that Oregon's
suicide law discriminates against those who cannot swallow. The body
was cremated within a day; consequently, no autopsy could ascertain
the cause of death. Doctors and other citizens demanded that the
prosecutor investigate the death, because illegal suffocation of
the patient has been the most frequent method of "helping" patients
die when assisted suicide attempts fail.
In response to inquiry, Oregon's Deputy Attorney General issued
an opinion indicating that lethal injection may need to be accepted
once assisted suicide is accepted, because Oregon's assisted suicide
law does not provide "equal access" to its provisions by disabled
people who cannot swallow and may violate the Americans with Disabilities
Act. The important legal implication of such failed assisted suicide
cases is that they are bound to bring in lethal injection. That is
what has happened in the Netherlands (Canady, 1996; Hendin et al.,
1997). That is the dilemma prominent euthanasia proponent, Dr. Sherwin
Nuland (2000), raised in the New England Journal of Medicine -- if
doctors are going to start carrying out assisted suicides, they will
need lethal injection to finish the job -- and lethal injection clearly
gives power and control to doctors, nurses, and health care systems,
not to the patient. And that is what is being brought up already
by Deputy Attorney General David Schuman in Oregon.
The United States Supreme Court, as discussed in its 1997 decision,
Washington et al. v. Glucksberg, stated "...it turns out that what
is couched as a limited right to 'physician assisted suicide' is
likely, in effect, a much broader license, which could prove extremely
difficult to police and contain." The inevitable progression to
lethal injection, which occurred in the Netherlands, is already occurring
in Oregon.
CONCLUSION
The need for improved education and research to promote pain and
palliative care is overwhelming. The Pain Relief Promotion Act makes
provision for improving such education and research about pain treatment
and palliative care. It clarifies to physicians, nurses, and state
medical boards, as well as to law enforcement personnel, that provision
of pain medicine is a legitimate medical practice, even if in rare
instances there may be an added risk to a patient's life. Since previous
testimony presented by Physicians for Compassionate Care, June 24,
1999, any legitimate concerns about a hypothetical "chilling effect" or
change in the balance of federal and state jurisdictions in dealing
with controlled substances have been alleviated.
During the same time interval, patients in Oregon have continued
to die untimely deaths, being given lethal overdoses of federally
controlled substances instead of pain treatment and palliative care
they deserve. There has been the revelation of yet another case of
a mentally infirm woman not being protected against assisted suicide
in an HMO and under pressure from her family. There have been reports
of assisted suicide expanding to the practice of involuntary euthanasia
in the case of hospice patients. And there have been failed assisted
suicide attempts, resulting in a call for introduction of more sure
methods of ending the lives of vulnerable patients, that is, lethal
injection. These cases and the failure to report any of these documented
tragic cases in official reports make it clear that allowing the
use of controlled substances for assisted suicide creates a public
danger.
There already have been too many deaths of American citizens caused
by overdosing vulnerable patients with dangerous federally controlled
substances. It is time to stop the killing of American citizens using
federal DEA registrations to prescribe federally controlled substances
for lethal overdoses instead of for needed pain treatment and palliative
care. Physicians for Compassionate Care urges you immediately to
pass the Pain Relief Promotion Act.
Respectfully submitted,
N. Gregory Hamilton, M.D.
2250 N.W. Flanders, # 306
(503) 226-0558
REFERENCES
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October 17, 1999, G1&2.
Barnett, E.H. (1999b). "Man with ALS Makes up his Mind to Die." Oregonian,
March 11, 1999, D1.
Canady, C.T. Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands:
A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady to the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.,
2d, 10-11 (Comm. Print 1996)
Foley, K. and Hendin, H. (1999). "The Oregon Report: Don't Ask, Don't
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Groenewoud, J.H. et al. (2000). "Clinical Problems with the Performance
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England Journal of Medicine 342:551-556.
Hamilton, C. (2000). "The Oregon Report: What's Hiding Behind the
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Medical Association 277:1720-1722.
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Practice, New England Journal of Medicine 342:583.
Sullivan, A.D. et al. (2000). "Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide
in Oregon -- The Second Year," New England Journal of Medicine 342:598-604.
Smith, W.J. (1999). "Suicide Unlimited in Oregon." Weekly Standard,
November 8, 1999, pp. 11-14.
Tims, D. (2000). "Sheridan Patient Recalls Ordeal," Oregonian, March
26, 2000, A1.
Tims, D. et al. (2000). "Hospice Faces Inquiry after Four Deaths." Oregonian,
March 16, 2000, A1.
Tsao, E. (2000). "Some Patients Who Died Refused Morphine, Records
Show." Oregonian, March 26, 2000, A10. United States Supreme Court,
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